|Tipo di tesi||Tesi di laurea magistrale|
|Titolo||L'opzione di uscita in un gioco del bene pubblico con arbitri corruttibili. Uno studio sperimentale.|
|Titolo in inglese||The exit option in a public good game with corruptible umpires. An experimental study.|
|Struttura||Dipartimento di Comunicazione ed Economia|
|Corso di studi||MANAGEMENT E COMUNICAZIONE D'IMPRESA (D.M. 270/04)|
|Data inizio appello||2020-12-10|
|Disponibilità||Accesso limitato: si può decidere quali file della tesi rendere accessibili. Disponibilità mixed (scegli questa opzione se vuoi rendere inaccessibili tutti i file della tesi o parte di essi)|
|Data di rilascio||2060-12-10|
Il problema della contribuzione volontaria alla produzione dei beni pubblici è un tema fondamentale in economia. La teoria dei giochi ha il merito di aver formalizzato tale problema attraverso un modello matematico in grado di predire il comportamento degli agenti razionali. Sulla base di questa teoria, la defezione è la strategia dominante e il risultato che ciò implica è la non produzione del bene pubblico.
The question about voluntary contribution to the production of public goods is a fundamental argument in economy. Game theory has the merit of having formalized such question through a mathematic model capable of predict the behaviour of rational agents. On the basis of this theory, defection is the dominant strategy and the result that it implies is the non-production of public good. Nevertheless, experimental studies have in part denied this outcome. People, actually, show a more contributory behaviour. However, the free rider problem, i.e. of who not cooperate but exploit others’ contribution, remains. Several mechanisms were been studied with the scope to find those most effectiveness to sustain cooperation. Among these there are punishments and the exit option. Experimental and evolutionary study seem to agree on great efficacy of the formers, when they are enforce by other players or an external authority, whereas as concern exit option results are controversial. But what happens when are corruptible umpire to punish players? Taking the cues from a recent evolutionary study, we have built an experimental design with the aim to investigate actual behaviour of people when their choices and results depend not only from expectations about choices of the other players, but also about what kind of umpire they will meet. In particular, through this work we wanted analyse whether exit option is adopted as well as predicted by the theoretical study. Research work is composed on two parts. In the first it is made an introduction on the argument of public goods and on the discussion of the latter by game theory. Moreover, it is analysed literature concerning both contribution and the exit option in public good game studies. In the second part, we will describe the two experiments conduct. The first is less elaborated and complex for both his paper format and structure. It was tested on personal acquaintances and it could be considered as a pilot experiment. The second, more sophisticated and structured, was been conducted on students that have participated at distance through a platform for behavioural research and a video-chat tool. For both the experiments it will be describe the choices adopted in relation to their structure and parameters. This will allow us to critically comment results came from data analysis.