Riassunto analitico
The thesis has the target to aplly Condition-Dependent Mistakes and Payoff-Dependent Mistakes to the language game proposed by Neary 2012.
In suche model there is a population of agents, that play a pure coordination game with two strategies for each player. The population is divided in two symmetric groups in the sense that they are equal in terms of numbers. Each group has his preferred action.
Through the application of the three different configurations of errors, we find that if we change the way through which agents commit mistakes, also the Equilibrium Stochastically Stable changes.
With mistakes dipendent on the value of the expected value of the payoff (Payoff-Dependent), the type monomorphic equilibrium is more easily selected. With Condition-Dependtnt mistakes, the equilibrium more probable to be seen in the long run, it is the Monomorphic State.
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